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REVVING-UP REVLON IN THE WAKE OF RURAL METRO:
A CALL FOR DIRECT LIABILITY ON FINANCIAL ADVISORS
Joseph P. DiCarlo*
I. INTRODUCTION
Corporate business and finance is grounded in transactional expertise.
In modern business, the decisions made and actions taken by corporate
directors and officers are critical in the context of mergers and acquisitions
(M&A) because of the integral role that these directors and officers play in
the transactions.1 Equally, if not more, essential is the role of financial
advisors, namely investment banks.2 Today, 97.5% of M&A transactions
valuing over $100 million attract stockholder litigation,3 which ensues when
shareholders believe their investments have been exposed to adverse effects
of the mergers, such as losses from bad sales or poor decisions by directors
and officers.4 In such litigation, plaintiffs’ attorneys have targeted sell-side
financial advisors in their search for “deep-pocketed” defendants.5
Traditionally in stockholder litigation, corporate officers, accountants,
auditors, and those handling financial reporting were “considered primary
components in maintaining integrity and public confidence in the
marketplace.”6 It seems, however, that plaintiffs have discovered that
* J.D. Candidate, 2018, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., magna cum laude, 2015,
The College of New Jersey. I would like to express my gratitude to my faculty advisor,
Stephen Lubben, for his guidance in the writing of this Comment.
1
Alexandra R. Lajoux, Role of the Board in M&A, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Sept. 7, 2015), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/contributor/alexlajoux/ (explaining that directors have two main roles in M&A transactions: readiness and
oversight).
2
Dale Arthur Oesterle & Jon R. Norberg, Management Buyouts: Creating or
Appropriating Shareholder Wealth?, 41 VAND. L. REV. 207, 211 (1988). The financial
advisor is hired by the corporation for its expertise in the current or prospective M&A
transaction. Id. Often, the chosen advisors are investment banks, which present expertise in
“price evaluations and assistance in securing financing, issuing new securities, structuring
bids, and mounting defenses.” See id.
3
Robert S. Reder & Stephanie Stroup Estey, Sell-Side Financial Advisors in the M&A
Crosshairs, 68 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 279, 280 (2015).
4
See generally id. (suggesting that poor decisions from investment advisors and
directors may result in loss of shareholders’ stock value, resulting in millions of dollars in
liability).
5
Id. at 279.
6
Mark Klock, Two Possible Answers to the Enron Experience: Will It Be Regulation of
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financial advisors also play an integral role in M&A, as they have begun to
target “sell-side financial advisors as a means to obtain monetary
damages . . . by claiming these advisors aided and abetted alleged fiduciary
breaches by the target company boards which retained them.”7
It is well settled that in M&A, sell-side boards of directors can be held
liable for breach of fiduciary duty to shareholders of corporations.8 Section
102(b)(7) of Delaware General Corporate Law, however, permits a
corporation to include an exculpatory provision in its certificate of
incorporation that protects individual directors from personal liability to
shareholders for breaches of fiduciary duties.9 Yet, the statute does not
mention whether corporate officers or corporate advisors, such as investment
banks, are similarly shielded.10 Over the past few decades, courts have ruled
that sell-side boards of directors and corporate officers may be held liable
for breaches of fiduciary duties resulting from the transaction, if certain
conditions exist.11 Arguably, the most important case regarding director and
officer liability in transactions is Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes
Holdings,12 which set the tone for what would eventually become the modern
“Revlon doctrine.” In Revlon, the court stated that “[t]he ultimate
responsibility for managing the business and affairs of a corporation falls on
its board of directors, . . . [which owes] fiduciary duties of care and loyalty
to the corporation and its shareholders.”13
Modern case law, however, has increasingly targeted sell-side financial
advisors, namely investment banks, by holding advisors liable for aiding and
abetting directors’ breach of fiduciary duty.14 The paramount case, which
set the stage for this new trend over the past few years, is In re Rural Metro
Corp. Stockholders Litigation.15 In Rural Metro, the court held that a
Fortune Tellers or Rebirth of Secondary Liability?, 28 IOWA J. CORP. L. 69, 80 (2002).
7
Robert S. Reder & Margaret Dodson, Delaware Supreme Court Upholds Multi-Million
Dollar Damages Award Against Sell-Side M&A Advisor, 69 VAND L. REV. EN BANC 27, 27
(2016).
8
See generally Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173,
185 (Del. 1986); In re TIBCO Software Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 10319-CB, 2015 Del.
Ch. LEXIS 265, at *68–77 (Del. Ch. Oct. 20, 2015); Mohsen Manesh, Nearing 30, Is Revlon
Showing Its Age?, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 107 (2014).
9
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2015).
10
See Reder & Dodson, supra note 7, at 28.
11
See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 185; TIBCO, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 265, at *68–77.
12
506 A.2d 173. Revlon is integral to the field, as it still serves as the basis for the
continuing expansion of the doctrine, which this Comment argues is displayed in Rural Metro.
See In re Rural Metro Corp. Stockholders Litig., 88 A.3d 54 (Del. Ch. 2014).
13
Revlon, 506 A.2d. at 179.
14
See, e.g., In re Zale Corp. Stockholders Litig., No. 9388-VCP, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS
274 (Del. Ch. Oct. 29, 2015); TIBCO, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 265; Rural Metro, 88 A.3d 54.
15
Rural Metro, 88 A.3d 54 (holding the financial advisors liable for aiding and abetting
breach of fiduciary duty by directors in sale of company).
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company’s board of directors had breached its fiduciary duties to its
shareholders, and subsequently ruled that the company’s advisor, an
investment bank, had knowingly aided and abetted in the breach of those
duties.16 Sell-side financial advisors should not take rulings like Rural Metro
lightly, as the Delaware Chancery Court held the advisor liable for $78.5
million in damages for aiding and abetting.17
This Comment highlights the Rural Metro doctrine’s importance and
its implications on financial advisors in sell-side transactions and mergers.
Predominantly, this Comment argues that the Rural Metro doctrine is more
essential than ever as an expansion of the Revlon doctrine, and that financial
advisor liability should not be dependent on the liability of the directors and
boards. Financial advisors have an incredible impact on sell-side M&A
because of their expertise and influence on the boards of directors, and
should, therefore, be held to a higher standard. Part II examines the history
and background of case law and the liability of different parties in sell-side
transactions, including financial advisors. This discussion focuses first on
the Revlon doctrine, and then highlights key cases that have expanded
liability in sell-side transactions through use of the Rural Metro doctrine.
Part III explores the role of financial advisors in M&A. Part IV examines
the modern expansion of the Revlon doctrine and its implications on financial
advisors. Lastly, Part V proposes that holding sell-side financial advisors
directly liable to the shareholders is imperative to make the advisors more
accountable and increase shareholder protection during mergers and
acquisitions.
II. THE BUILDING BLOCKS OF THE MODERN DOCTRINE: SECTION
102(b)(7) AND REVLON
A. Delaware Code § 102(b)(7)
The Delaware legislature initially lightened the burden of liability on
directors by permitting exculpation provisions in a corporation’s governing
documents.18 These provisions remove liability for breaches of the duty of
care.19 Section 102(b) of the Delaware Code states:

16
Rural Metro, 88 A.3d at 63. For a thorough discussion of the Rural Metro case and
the Rural Metro doctrine, see infra Part IV.C.1.
17
Reder & Dodson, supra note 7, at 28; see Manesh, supra note 8, at 134 (“[T]he
investment banks that knowingly advise or assist corporate boards in an unreasonable sales
process may face harsh monetary sanctions for aiding and abetting a Revlon violation.”).
18
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2015).
19
Id.
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In addition to the matters required to be set forth in the certificate
of incorporation by subsection (a) of this section, the certificate of
incorporation may also contain any or all of the following
matters: . . . (7) A provision eliminating or limiting the personal
liability of a director to the corporation or its stockholders for
monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a director,
provided that such provision shall not eliminate or limit the
liability of a director: (i) For any breach of the director’s duty of
loyalty to the corporation or its stockholders; (ii) for acts or
omissions not in good faith or which involve intentional
misconduct
or
a
knowing
violation
of
law;
(iii) under § 174 of this title; or (iv) for any transaction from which
the director derived an improper personal benefit.20
In addition to providing protection to the individual directors, section
102(b)(7) ensures that individual directors and corporate officers “do not
become overly risk-averse,” though officers are not actually protected under
the statute.21 Section 102(b)(7) exculpatory provisions have had a profound
effect on change-of-control transactions because of their power to provide
complete protection to directors from certain liabilities.22 Ultimately,
exculpatory provisions eliminate director liability to the shareholders for a
breach of the duty of care.23 Delaware courts have protected individual
directors by honoring exculpatory clauses even when they have found that
the board, as a whole, had breached its duty of care.24
Despite the favorable protections exculpatory provisions provide to
directors, these clauses do not expressly protect officers, financial advisors,
or bad faith directors. Nor is Delaware legislature’s intent clear from section
102(b)(7).25 The statutory language refers to individual directors, but “it
20

Id.
Id. at 87.
22
WILLIAM K. SJOSTROM, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: A TRANSACTIONAL APPROACH
449 (2d ed. 2016) (stating that an exculpatory provision, as designated in section 102(b)(7),
“essentially allows a corporation to opt out of having its directors be personally liable for
monetary damages for breach of the duty of care”). Revlon ultimately creates a separate duty,
which is used in change-of-control scenarios. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes
Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
23
In re Rural Metro Corp. Stockholders Litig., 88 A.3d 54, 86 (Del. Ch. 2014).
24
See, e.g., In re TIBCO Software Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 10319-CB, 2015 Del.
Ch. LEXIS 265 (Del. Ch. Oct. 20, 2015); In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig., 967 A.2d 640 (Del.
Ch. 2008); McPadden v. Sidhu, 964 A.2d 1262 (Del. Ch. 2008). Under section 102(b)(7), a
duty of care claim is essentially destroyed if there is an exculpation provision in the
corporation’s governing documents. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2015).
Therefore, courts will usually protect the directors from liability under the duty of care unless
their decisions are grossly negligent. McPadden, 964 A.2d at 1273–74.
25
See Manesh, supra note 8, at 118. Directors who act with gross bad faith or
malevolence may not be protected by the statute. Id.
21
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does not extend to aiders and abettors.”26 In re TIBCO Software Inc.
Stockholders Litigation, which will be discussed in Part IV, C, illustrated this
point. There the Delaware Chancery court held that although the directors
were not personally liable for their breach of fiduciary duty, the financial
advisor was liable for aiding and abetting that breach because section
102(b)(7) does not apply to financial advisors.27 Section 102(b)(7) displayed
the Delaware legislature’s statutory approach to director liability in M&A
transactions, and the courts followed with their own approach in Revlon.
B. The Revlon Doctrine
Revlon allowed the Delaware courts to consider the scope of directors’
liability in sell-side transactions.28 In Revlon, the Chairman of the Board and
Chief Executive Officer of Pantry Pride, Inc., met with his counterpart at
Revlon to discuss a possible acquisition of Revlon, Inc.29 The Pantry Pride
board subsequently authorized the Chairman to acquire Revlon, and the
Revlon board met to consider the impending threat of a hostile bid from
Pantry Pride.30 At the meeting, Lazard Freres, Revlon’s investment banker,
advised the directors that Pantry Pride’s asking price for Revlon stock was
incredibly inadequate.31 A number of failed negotiations followed that initial
offering, with increasing bid offers from Pantry Pride for Revlon stock.32
Eventually, Pantry Pride announced “it would engage in fractional bidding
and top any [other third-party] offer by a slightly higher one.”33 The Revlon
board, however, approved a third-party proposal at a price point higher than
the Pantry Pride bid because the Board thought the third-party proposal
better protected the Revlon shareholders.34

26

Rural Metro, 88 A.3d at 86; see Manesh, supra note 8, at 130.
See TIBCO, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 265, at *69–71; see also Reder, supra note 7, at 28;
contra Susan E. Springer, Casenote, Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank and the Demise of
Section 10(b) Private Aiding and Abetting Liability: Opting for a Rule of Economic Efficiency,
4 GEO. MASON L. REV. 213, 213 (1995) (explaining that in prior case law, the Supreme Court
had “denied private plaintiffs the right to sue aiders and abettors under” the 1934 Securities
Exchange Act).
28
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 185 (1986).
29
Id. at 176.
30
Id.
31
Id. at 177.
32
Id. at 177–78.
33
Id. at 178.
34
Revlon, 506 A.2d at 179 (“The board unanimously approved Forstmann’s proposal
because: (1) it was for a higher price than the Pantry Pride bid, (2) it protected the noteholders,
and (3) Forstmann’s financing was firmly in place.”).
27
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The Revlon court held the board of directors liable for breaching its
fiduciary duty to its stockholders.35 The Supreme Court of Delaware created
a new fiduciary duty: a corporation’s board of directors in a sell-side
transaction must simply get the “best price” for its shareholders.36
Furthermore, the court made clear that directors are “strictly held” to their
fiduciary duties to the stockholders.37 The Delaware court found that the
Revlon’s directors were concerned only with certain noteholders when they
accepted the later third-party deal, rather than actually maximizing the sale
price for the benefit of Revlon’s stockholders.38 The court reasoned that
upon the imminent breakup and sale of the company, the Revlon “directors’
role changed from defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged
with getting the best price for the stockholders . . . .”39 Ultimately, Revlon
created a separate duty, which stands for the rule that in M&A, sell-side
boards of directors are held to a strict duty to obtain the best price for
shareholders and maximize value.40
C. Debate over the Revlon Ruling
The Revlon ruling has inspired study and debate among scholars and
practitioners over the past few decades. Some, like professors Lyman
Johnson and Robert Ricca, assert that the Revlon doctrine is obsolete and no
longer has a profound effect on the M&A field.41 Johnson and Ricca’s thesis
argues that courts are reluctant to hold the board liable unless there is clearly
outrageous conduct from a board of directors.42 They argue that modern
corporate and financial law has evolved so rapidly around Revlon that the
importance of the doctrine has been severely diminished.43 In addition,
Johnson and Ricca assert that the Revlon doctrine no longer helps plaintiffs
in suits against financial advisors because the courts have bestowed a “heavy
burden” on litigants to prove that investment advisors aided and abetted the

35
Id. at 182. No fiduciary duty was breached; instead, a new kind of duty was created by
the Delaware Supreme Court, which applies specifically to change of control transactions.
See id.
36
Id.
37
Id. at 181. The court noted that this standard requires the directors to act in the best
interest of the corporation and its shareholders, imposing “an enhanced duty to abjure any
action that is motivated by considerations other than a good faith concern for such interests.”
Id.
38
Id. at 182.
39
Id.
40
Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.
41
Lyman Johnson & Robert Ricca, The Still-Dwindled Revlon, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
ONLINE 150 (2014).
42
Id. at 152.
43
Id. at 151.
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breach of fiduciary duty.44
Others, in contrast, oppose Johnson and Ricca’s argument, and explain
that the Revlon doctrine has, in fact, expanded its reach with the evolution of
modern corporate law and change-of-control transactions.45 For example,
Professor Mohsen Manesh directly rejects Johnson and Ricca’s thesis.46
Instead, Manesh explains how recent Delaware case law “underscore[s] the
expansive reach” of the Revlon doctrine.47 Specifically, he discusses that
Revlon’s expansion is demonstrated by the courts’ application of the doctrine
to corporate financial advisors.48 Manesh contends that Revlon is a
significant legal precedent today, and that “chancery court decisions
demonstrate Revlon’s extensive grasp, reaching corporate directors, officers,
and even corporate advisors” to protect shareholders in change-of-control
transactions.49 Furthermore, Professor Manesh argues that the Revlon
doctrine’s present relevancy is illustrated by continued scholarly debate and
interest in its boundaries.50
Although the boundaries of Revlon remain unsettled and unclear, this
Comment supports Professor Manesh’s stance, and argues that the Revlon
doctrine is not only still relevant, but is actually expanding further into the
different realms of corporate law. The Revlon doctrine, however, should be
even further expanded to hold financial advisors to a higher standard.51 That
is, financial advisor’s liability should not be solely dependent on a finding of
aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty, but they should be directly
accountable for breaches of fiduciary duties to a corporation’s shareholders
for the acquisitions on which they have a heavy negative impact.

44

Id. at 153.
See generally Manesh, supra note 8.
46
See generally Manesh, supra note 8.
47
See generally Manesh, supra note 8, at 110. See, e.g., In re TIBCO Software Inc.
Stockholders Litig., No. 10319-CB, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 265 (Oct. 20, 2015); In re Rural
Metro Corp. Stockholders Litig., 88 A.3d 54 (Del. Ch. 2014).
48
Manesh, supra note 8, at 129–30.
49
Manesh, supra note 8, at 145.
50
Manesh, supra note 8, at 108.
51
As the Rural Metro holding demonstrates, financial advisors can be held liable for
aiding and abetting, but not direct liability to the shareholders. See Rural Metro, 88 A.3d 54.
45
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THE ROLE OF FINANCIAL ADVISORS IN M&A TRANSACTIONS

A. Financial Advisors and Sell-Side Transactions
Financial advisors, namely investment banks, have a crucial and
profound role in, and effect on, sell-side transactions.52 Investment bankers
have three main roles in M&A: (1) a facilitator function; (2) to give fairness
opinions; and (3) a strategic advisory function.53 The financial advisor, as a
facilitator, has two primary roles. First, the investment banker must arrange
acquisition financing.54 Raising capital is perhaps the investment banker’s
most important function in the transaction, and his or her skillset is required
to design complex financial plans and instruments needed to tend to certain
transactions such as mergers.55 Second, an investment banker is an
“auctioneer” in sell-side transactions: he or she essentially negotiates with
the prospective acquiring companies to obtain the best share price.56 An
investment banker’s expertise in the market and the effectiveness of certain
share prices are crucial to negotiations.57
Next, the financial advisor’s arguably most controversial and
influential responsibility in M&A is to issue “fairness opinions.”58 A
fairness opinion is an investment banker’s opinion as to whether a
prospective acquirer’s bid is a “fair” asking price for the shares.59 These
opinions are heavily considered by the board of directors, and may include
the investment bankers’ recommendation of whether the board it advises
should sell the company.60 Fairness opinions have been heavily criticized,61
and “[m]uch of the criticism focuses on the potential for conflicts of interest
between the shareholders, the purported beneficiaries of the opinion, and the
investment banker.”62 The misuse of fairness opinions by financial advisors
52

See generally Oesterle & Norberg, supra note 2; see also M. Breen Haire, The
Fiduciary Responsibilities of Investment Bankers in Change-of-Control Transactions: In re
Daisy Systems Corp., 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 277 (1999).
53
Haire, supra note 52, at 290–91.
54
Haire, supra note 52, at 290–91.
55
Haire, supra note 52, at 290–91.
56
Haire, supra note 52, at 291.
57
Haire, supra note 52, at 291.
58
Haire, supra note 52, at 292. It is the most influential function of the advisor, because
the boards’ decisions to buy or sell a company will rely heavily on the fairness opinion it
receives from its financial advisors.
59
Haire, supra note 52, at 292–95; see In re TIBCO Software Inc. Stockholders Litig.,
No. 10319-CB, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 265, at *22–23 (Oct. 20, 2015).
60
See TIBCO, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS at *22–23.
61
Haire, supra note 52, at 293 (first citing Robert J. Giuffra, Jr., Investment Bankers’
Fairness Opinions in Corporate Control Transactions, 96 YALE L.J. 119, 123, 127–28 (1986);
then citing Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Trans Union Reconsidered, 98 YALE
L.J. 127, 141 (1988)).
62
Haire, supra note 52, at 293.
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during the decision-making process can adversely influence the directors to
injuriously accept or reject an offer from a potential acquirer, often making
shareholders vulnerable in M&A transactions.63 Nonetheless, the Delaware
Supreme Court has previously criticized a corporate board for not obtaining
a fairness opinion from a financial advisor.64 In fact, today, a failure to obtain
a fairness opinion from a financial advisor would most likely be suspect.65
The sell-side financial advisor’s final role in M&A is to serve as a
“strategic advisor.”66 This is the “most undefined and variable aspect of the
[financial advisor’s] role” in change-of-control transactions.67 In this role,
the investment banker may be asked to advise the board on the amount of
capital, equity, or financing that the company should have readily accessible
in the event an acquisition occurs, and to provide critical insights into certain
bidders and financial estimates.68 These various integral roles that financial
advisors play in modern M&A transactions give them the ability to greatly
influence the board’s decision to sell or not sell the company.
B. The Advisor’s Influence on the Corporation
Financial advisors drive negotiations, and their valuations and expertise
are what guide the board to make certain decisions.69 As savvy corporate
players, the advisors act with full knowledge of their influence on the
board.70
When financial advisors, mainly investment banks, give honest and
candid advice about sell-side transactions to boards, they play a constructive
and important role in the process.71 When directors are overwhelmed with
tender offers, they often turn to investment bankers for aid in evaluating and
63

See Oesterle & Norberg, supra note 2, at 250. Such an action may result in financial
harm to the shareholders due to loss of share value.
64
Haire, supra note 52, at 292 (citing Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 876–77 (Del.
1985)).
65
See Haire, supra note 52, at 292–93 (citing Leonard Chazen, Fairness from a
Financial Point of View in Acquisitions of Public Companies: Is “Third-Party Sale Value”
the Appropriate Standard?, 36 BUS. LAW. 1439, 1442 (1981) (noting that nonuse of fairness
opinion “would probably raise eyebrows”)).
66
Haire, supra note 52, at 295.
67
Haire, supra note 52, at 295.
68
Haire, supra note 52, at 295.
69
See Haire, supra note 52, at 295.
70
See In re Rural Metro Corp. Stockholders Litig., 88 A.3d 54 (Del. Ch. 2014) (where
the advisors’ opinions were so influential that they essentially made the decisions for the
directors); In re TIBCO Software Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 10319-CB, 2015 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 265 (Oct. 20, 2015) (involving financial advisors’ heavy influence on the directors).
71
See Oesterle & Norberg, supra note 2, at 211 (“The investment bankers play an
important role when they give honest advice based on their special financial expertise.”). This
is important to the process, because the advisors may have special expertise in the area that
the directors do not necessarily possess. Id.
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structuring the bids.72 Problems arise, however, when fairness opinions are
not necessarily specialized for each company, but are instead “made-toorder,” supporting the positions that the directors have already taken.73
When the boards’ interests are not parallel to those of its shareholders, these
types of fairness opinions jeopardize shareholder investments and only mask
the true intentions of the managers.74
The Delaware courts have acknowledged the great influence that the
advisors have on the corporations’ boards of directors.75 In In re Del Monte
Foods Co. Shareholders Litigation, the Delaware Chancery Court
acknowledged the “pivotal role” that advisors play in the transactions, and
noted that the courts “will consider the extent to which a board has relied on
expert advisors.”76 Furthermore, the court explained that due to the financial
advisors’ influential and important role in the execution and implementation
of the strategy in the transaction, advisors had to fully disclose their
compensation and activities.77 As the Delaware Chancery Court has
recognized, the investment banker’s influence on boards of directors cannot
go untethered and unrestrained.78
Therefore, there needs to be a stronger focus on the direct liability of
financial advisors to the shareholders of the corporations they advise in sellside transactions. To ensure a healthy and fruitful transaction for the
corporations’ shareholders, the boards look to financial advisors for their
expertise.79 As a result, the advisors have just as much power, if not more,
to positively or negatively affect stockholder value stemming from M&A
transactions.
72

See Oesterle & Norberg, supra note 2, at 211.
See Oesterle & Norberg, supra note 2, at 211.
74
See Oesterle & Norberg, supra note 2, at 211–12 (citing Plaza Secs. Co. v. Fruehauf
Corp., 643 F. Supp. 1535, 1537 (E.D. Mich.), aff’d, Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., 798 F.2d 882
(6th Cir. 1986)) (describing that if the boards’ intentions are not in line with the shareholders’,
untrue fairness opinions only help to mask the danger).
75
See In re Del Monte Foods Co. S’holders Litig., 25 A.3d 813 (Del. Ch. 2011).
76
Id. at 844–45 (ordering a preliminary injunction to prevent a merger even though the
board of directors acted in good faith to execute a beneficial merger, because the board, in
fact, injured the shareholders due to the misleading and malevolent intentions of the financial
advisor it hired). This Comment is centered on curing cases such as In re Del Monte, where
the financial advisor is not held liable because such liability to the shareholders is dependent
on a finding of a breach of duty by the board. In Del Monte, it is clear the investment bankers
were the main reason that the sale did not result in a beneficial outcome, and their bad faith
intentions had great influence on the directors and encouraged the sale. Id. at 833, 836.
Financial advisors who conduct business in this manner should be directly liable for their
actions.
77
Id. at 832.
78
See id.; In re Rural Metro Corp. Stockholders Litig., 88 A.3d 54 (Del. Ch. 2014); In
re TIBCO Software Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 10319-CB, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 265 (Oct.
20, 2015).
79
See generally Haire, supra note 52.
73
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MODERN EXPANSION OF THE REVLON DOCTRINE TO FINANCIAL
ADVISORS

A. Self-Regulation of Investment Bankers
Due to the influence that investment bankers have on corporate
transactions, there has been some attempt for self-regulation of financial
advisors, but it may not be enough to protect shareholders. A number of
professions have turned to self-regulation of misconduct, but most to greater
avail than investment banking.80 Professor Andrew Tuch, in his article “The
Self-Regulation of Investment Bankers,” explains that investment bankers
are the “masters” of the financial industry and are scrutinized by the
Delaware courts regarding “high-stakes” change-of-control transactions.81
Tuch acknowledges that corporations that hire financial advisors are not able
to fend for themselves during big M&A transactions, but that vulnerability
should not characterize the relationship between the advisors and the
boards.82 Instead, “the relationships between investment banking firms and
their clients are often characterized as fiduciary.”83 This suggests that
although financial advisors do not owe fiduciary duties to the shareholders
of corporations they advise, the advisors do owe such a duty to the boards
that hire them.84
The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) is the selfregulatory entity for investment bankers and brokers.85 It is registered with
the Securities and Exchange Commission and functions under its
supervision, authorized by Congress to “take action to ensure that investors
are protected.”86 FINRA was created to serve as an internal mechanism
whereby the investment banking community could fix some of the issues in
the profession.87 Delaware courts may scrutinize and reprimand investment

80

See Sande L. Buhai, Profession: A Definition, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 241, 272–74
(explaining that professional misconduct is governed by self-regulated entities in the fields of
law, medicine, and accounting); Samuel J. Levine, The Law: Business or Profession?: The
Continuing Relevance of Julius Henry Cohen for the Practice of Law in the Twenty-First
Century, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1, 8, 13 (2012) (explaining the self-regulation of lawyers).
81
Andrew F. Tuch, The Self-Regulation of Investment Bankers, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
101, 102 (2014).
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
See generally id. Since the boards hire the advisors, the boards are considered the
advisors’ clients. Therefore, the advisors owe the boards a fiduciary duty. This Comment
argues that, by extension, the advisors should owe the companies fiduciary duties.
85
Id. at 104.
86
FINRA 2012 Year in Review and Annual Financial Report, FINRA (2012),
https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/Corporate/p291721.pdf.
87
Tuch, supra note 81 (discussing issues such as fraud, breach of fiduciary duties, and
misconduct).
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bankers, but FINRA is responsible for disciplining them for misconduct.88
Unfortunately, FINRA has largely been ineffective as a self-regulation
tool and has imposed few sanctions on investment bankers.89 Tuch noted
“enforcement activity [under FINRA] likely underdeterred investment
bankers’ misconduct and failed to provide any credible deterrence against
such misconduct,” and most likely resulted in burdens that were greater than
the benefits.90
Tuch’s conclusions cause concern, considering the
weaknesses of other programs that were meant to alleviate misconduct in
investment banking.91
B. Why Do the Shareholders Go After the Advisors?
There are three main reasons that plaintiff-shareholders seek recovery
from financial advisors in adverse sell-side transactions. First, current
methods of regulation do not adequately protect shareholders from
investment banker misconduct.92 As a result, shareholders sometimes turn
to the courts to have the advisors held liable for their participation in bad
sales.93
Second, plaintiff-shareholders recognize the possibility of recovering
damages from the financial advisors’ “deeper pockets.”94 The financial
advisors in sell-side transactions are typically investment banks, many of
which generate some of the highest revenues in the world and earn places on
the Fortune 500 list.95 In 2016, the top ten investment banks alone generated

88

Id. at 104
Id. at 173 (“FINRA appears to have virtually abdicated its role of enforcing its rules
against one important category of broker-dealer: the investment banker. Despite evidence of
potentially pervasive misconduct, FINRA imposed remarkably few sanctions on investment
bankers during the sixty-six month period studied. That enforcement activity likely
underdeterred investment bankers’ misconduct and failed to provide any credible deterrence
against such misconduct.”).
90
Id. at 148–49 (“The existing system of self-regulation burdens investment bankers and
their employers by imposing extensive qualifications and registration requirements . . . . It
imposes other constraints on firms relating to their financial condition and operations and
record-keeping . . . . Given the burdens and the limited deterrence benefits, it is clearly
reasonable to believe that the costs of FINRA’s existing regulation of investment bankers, as
now administered, exceed the benefits.”).
91
Id. (explaining the ineffectiveness of both the Securities and Exchange Commission
and private enforcement in controlling investment banker misconduct).
92
See id.
93
See In re Rural Metro Corp. Stockholders Litig., 88 A.3d 54 (Del. Ch. 2014); In re
TIBCO Software Inc. Stockholders Litig., 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 265 (Oct. 20, 2015).
94
Christopher A. Ward & Jarrett K. Vine, Rural Metro: Potential Avenue for Recovery
in Bankruptcy Litigation, 33-5 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 22, 23 (2014).
95
Fortune 500, FORTUNE, http://beta.fortune.com/fortune500/list/ (last visited Oct. 23,
2016); Investment Banking Scorecard, WALL ST. J., http://graphics.wsj.com/investmentbanking-scorecard/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2016).
89
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over $54 billion in revenues.96 Notably, in 2015, the top ten investment
banks together advised M&A transactions that totaled roughly $7 trillion
dollars.97 Arguably, the shareholders are aware that these companies, such
as J.P. Morgan Chase and Goldman Sachs,98 have much bigger bank
accounts and much more cash on hand than corporations’ boards of directors.
Lastly, shareholders pursue claims against investment advisors to hold
them accountable for their actions in the acquisitions.99 Accountability is
incredibly important in high-value M&A transactions, because those with
the power to make and influence decisions, such as the directors and
advisors, should be responsible for the choices they make in structuring and
executing change-of-control transactions. With some skin in the game,
advisors will be more thorough and mindful in advising the boards during
merger negotiations. This argument is premised on the idea that the
misconduct of investment advisors in sell-side transactions is often the
catalyst of the bad sale,100 and, therefore, the investment banks should be
held directly liable for those actions.
C. Financial Advisor Liability
Section 102(b)(7) protects directors from breach of duty of care claims
only, not other fiduciary duty claims such as duty of loyalty actions.101 But
“bad faith or willing misconduct,” the required threshold for culpability,
presents a very difficult standard for shareholders to satisfy.102 The issue
with the current law is that the advisors’ liability is dependent upon a finding
of liability for breach of fiduciary duty on the part of the directors.103
Therefore, as the law stands, financial advisors cannot be directly liable for
their roles in M&A transactions. This is troublesome, as it not only leaves
shareholders vulnerable to the potential bad faith of financial advisors, but
96
Investment Banking Scorecard, WALL ST. J., http://graphics.wsj.com/investment-ban
king-scorecard/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2016).
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
See Tuch, supra note 81, at 163–64.
100
See In re Rural Metro Corp. Stockholders Litig., 88 A.3d 54 (Del. Ch. 2014) (where
the advisors’ opinions were so influential that they essentially made the decisions for the
directors); In re TIBCO Software Inc. Stockholders Litig., 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 265 (Oct.
20, 2015) (displaying the great influence that financial advisors can have on directors in M&A
transactions).
101
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2015). Revlon duties are not expressly protected
either under the statute. See id.
102
Reder & Dodson, supra note 7, at 28.
103
See Johnson & Ricca, supra note 41. Johnson and Ricca explain that courts’ current
narrow application of the doctrine has largely hindered shareholder recovery from investment
bankers for aiding and abetting. Id. at 152–53. Notably, while the investment banks can be
held liable for aiding and abetting, “such persons owe no direct fiduciary duties under Revlon,
or at all for that matter.” Id.
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also passively gives financial advisors a liability shield from penalties for
their actions regarding the transactions.
1. The Rural Metro Doctrine
Sell-side financial advisors were first held liable in In re Rural Metro
Corp. Stockholders Litigation,104 a decision that is paramount to the field and
has driven case law in Delaware since its ruling in 2013.105 In Rural Metro,
Rural Metro Corporation (Rural Metro) was in the process of being acquired
and hired RBC Capital Markets, LLC (RBC) as a financial advisor.106 RBC
was a subsidiary of the Royal Bank of Canada that Rural Metro’s board of
directors paid to assist in strategizing possible alternatives to a sale and
advise the board of directors throughout the acquisition exploration
period.107 Throughout its period of service to the board, RBC repeatedly
manipulated the Rural Metro board to advance its own interests and
maximize its earnings on the sale.108
The Rural Metro court found that, under the Revlon standard, the Rural
Metro board’s sale was unreasonable and that RBC was liable for knowingly
aiding and abetting the breach of fiduciary duty.109 Although the
shareholders settled with the directors, the court held their breach of
fiduciary duty to nonetheless be a sufficient prerequisite to finding that the
advisors had aided and abetted the breach.110 The court, following the guide
of section 102(b)(7), noted that the exculpatory provision in the agreement
protected only the directors from personal liability, not RBC.111
Furthermore, the court instructed that the plaintiffs must bear the
burden of proof for an aiding and abetting claim.112 Since the shareholders
settled with the board of directors and, therefore, pursued only the aiding and
abetting claim against the advisors, the shareholders beared that burden
104

Rural Metro, 88 A.3d 54.
Ward & Vine, supra note 94, at 23 (explaining that the Rural Metro decision was not
only seminal for corporate litigation, but was also a crucial precedent in bankruptcy law).
106
Rural Metro, 88 A.3d at 64.
107
Id. at 64–67.
108
Id.
109
Id. at 110; see Ward & Vine, supra note 94, at 22 (“The Delaware Chancery Court
held the financial adviser of a target board of directors ‘liable for aiding and abetting breaches
of fiduciary duty by the Board,’ even though (1) the board and a secondary financial adviser
had previously settled their own liability, (2) there was no breach of the duty of loyalty found
and (3) the company’s articles of incorporation contained a waiver of liability for the breach
of the duty of care. Specifically, in Rural Metro, the court held RBC Capital Markets LLC
liable for aiding and abetting the board of Rural/Metro Corp. in breaching their fiduciary
duties during the sale of the company to Warburg Pincus LLC.”).
110
Rural Metro, 88 A.3d at 63 (noting that the shareholders settled with the directors
before trial, but still decided to pursue the aiding and abetting claim against RBC).
111
Id. at 86; see also Ward & Vine, supra note 94, at 22.
112
Rural Metro, 88 A.3d at 84–85.
105
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against RBC.113 In addition, the court noted the following, which is the
essence of the Rural Metro doctrine:
For purposes of the aiding and abetting claim against RBC, this
decision need hold only that a claim for aiding and abetting a
breach of the duty of care can be maintained . . . when a third
party, for improper motives of its own, misleads the directors into
breaching their duty of care.114
RBC, through its manipulative and self-motivated plan, created an
unreasonable process and informational gaps that created the board’s breach
of fiduciary duty.115 As a result, the court found that RBC had aided and
abetted the claim.116
2. Current Effects and Implications of the Rural Metro
Doctrine on Financial Advisors
In the wake of the Rural Metro doctrine, boards of directors’ fiduciary
duties concerning their interactions with financial advisors in M&A
transactions are held to a higher standard, and the directors must be diligent
and informed when conducting transactions.117 This is not a simple
readjustment for the boards, such as exploring potential conflicts of interests
with the financial advisors.118 Rather, there should be agreements between
the boards and financial advisors calling for continuing disclosure of
information that may be relevant to the board’s sale of the corporation.119
The Rural Metro doctrine has had a profound effect on financial
advisors, as it is now very difficult for them to avoid conflicts resulting from
sell-side transactions.120 The financial advisors must now practice full
113
114
115
116

22.

Id.
Id. at 99.
Id.
Rural Metro, 88 A.3d 54; Manesh, supra note 8, at 131; see Ward, supra note 94, at

117
Reder & Dodson, supra note 7, at 37 (explaining that the board of directors must now
“be active and reasonably informed when overseeing a sale process, including identifying and
responding to actual or potential conflicts of interest”).
118
Id.
119
See id.
120
Id. at 38 (“As Rural Metro makes clear, financial advisors enjoy no similar statutory
or other protection, yet, as a practical matter, it is very difficult for them to avoid conflicts.
To be effective, investment bankers must talk to a wide range of players—both potential
buyers and sellers—in any given industry. Post-Rural Metro, the key to maintaining this same
level of effectiveness is to disclose any and all potentially material conflicts from the outset,
and as they may arise during the course, of a sell-side engagement. Complete and timely
disclosure will help insulate financial advisors from aiding and abetting claims by avoiding
the kind of ‘informational vacuum’ that led the Rural Metro [c]ourt to find that RBC had
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disclosure with the board of directors concerning all matters of the
transaction to give themselves the best protection against a shareholder
liability claim for aiding and abetting a board’s breach of fiduciary duties.121
Not only must the advisors fully disclose information to the directors, but
they must also practice the same communication with the shareholders so
that the shareholders are able to make fully informed decisions as to whether
to approve the transaction.122 Furthermore, financial advisors must be
extensive and thorough in their research of and discussions with potential
acquirers.123 In doing so, they must ensure that they are delivering accurate
information about the possible transactions to the board. Ultimately, the
“bottom line for directors and financial advisors operating in a post-Rural
Metro world is clear: full disclosure—by sell-side [financial] advisors to
their clients and by target company boards to their stockholders—is
crucial.”124 Full disclosure between those parties constitutes better
protection for the board and the financial advisors.
3. Rural Metro Under Current Law and the “Aiding and
Abetting” Requirement
i. Aiding and Abetting in the Wake of Rural Metro
A more in-depth discussion of Delaware’s requirements for aiding and
abetting on the part of the financial advisors will give a clearer sense of
Johnson and Ricca’s reasoning in support of their argument that the Revlon
doctrine is insignificant. Professor Manesh’s theory that the doctrine is still
relevant and significant is sound, however. Nevertheless, Manesh’s thesis
lacks focus on the importance of further expanding the doctrine to hold
advisors directly liable, not solely for aiding and abetting the directors’
breach.125 An aiding and abetting claim has four elements: “(i) the existence
of a fiduciary relationship, (ii) a breach of the fiduciary’s duty, (iii) knowing
participation in the breach by the non-fiduciary defendants, and (iv) damages
acted with the requisite scienter to support plaintiffs’ aiding and abetting claim.”).
121
Id.
122
Id.; see In re Zale Corp. Stockholders Litig., No. 9388-VCP, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS
274 (Oct. 29, 2015) (finding the shareholders’ fully informed vote invoked the business
judgment rule, thereby negating the directors’ alleged breach of duty, and, by extension, an
aiding and abetting claim against the advisors).
123
See Reder & Dodson, supra note 7, at 38 (“To be effective, investment bankers must
talk to a wide range of players—both potential buyers and sellers—in any given industry.
Post-Rural Metro, the key to maintaining this same level of effectiveness is to disclose any
and all potentially material conflicts from the outset, and as they may arise the course, of a
sell-side engagement.”).
124
Id. at 39.
125
See Johnson & Ricca, supra note 41 (arguing the doctrine, beginning with Revlon,
has “dwindled”); Manesh, supra note 8 (submitting that even though the liability hinges on
aiding and abetting, the modern doctrine is expanding and adapting to modern corporate law).
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proximately caused by the breach.”126
For sell-side transactions, the first element requires the court to find a
fiduciary relationship between the board of directors and the shareholders,
which inherently exists in every corporation.127 Unless otherwise provided
in the bylaws or articles of incorporation, a board of directors manages a
Delaware corporation’s business.128 The directors have inherent fiduciary
duties to the corporation and its shareholders.129 The directors must protect
the corporation’s shareholders’ interests and serve to their benefit under the
duties of care and loyalty.130 The choices that directors make are protected
by the “business judgment rule,” in which “there is a presumption that in
making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an
informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken
was in the best interests of the company.”131
Under the second element, the board’s misuse of its “business
judgment,” or any other action that violates its duties to shareholders, can
constitute a breach of fiduciary duty.132 If the plaintiffs meet their burden of
showing a possible breach of fiduciary duty or a misuse of business
judgment, a heavy burden then shifts to the directors to show that their
decision was “entirely fair.”133 In sell-side transactions, this means that the
126
In re Rural Metro Corp. Stockholders Litig., 88 A.3d 54, 80 (Del. Ch. 2014) (citing
Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1096 (Del. 2001)).
127
See id. at 80–81.
128
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2016).
129
See William Lafferty et al., A Brief Introduction to the Fiduciary Duties of Directors
Under Delaware Law, 116 PENN ST. L. REV. 837, 841 (citing Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 504,
510 (Del. 1939)) (“In fulfilling their managerial responsibilities, directors of Delaware
corporations are charged with a fiduciary duty to the corporation and to the corporation’s
stockholders.”).
130
Id. at 841 (citing Guth, 5 A.2d at 510) (explaining that directors must act as “trustees”
to the organization).
131
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180 (Del. 1986);
see Lafferty et al., supra note 129, at 841 (“When making corporate decisions, directors must
fulfill the traditional duties of care and loyalty in order to satisfy their fiduciary obligations to
the corporation and its stockholders . . . . A presumption exists under Delaware law that
corporate directors act in accordance with these duties when making business decisions. This
presumption is known as the ‘business judgment rule.’ The business judgment rule is a
deferential standard of review; Delaware courts will generally refrain from unreasonably
imposing themselves upon the business and affairs of a corporation when the board’s decision
can be attributed to some rational corporate purpose.”); see also Rural Metro, 88 A.3d at 87
(explaining that, similar to the business judgment rule, section 102(b)(7) promotes
stockholder interest by ensuring that the board of directors does not become overly riskaverse).
132
See Rural Metro, 88 A.3d at 97.
133
Lafferty et al., supra note 129, at 842 (“If the business judgment rule is rebutted by
showing a breach of either the duty of care or the duty of loyalty, the board’s action is
reviewed using the entire fairness standard, and the directors bear the heavy burden of proving
that the challenged decision or transaction is ‘entirely fair’ to the corporation and its
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directors must show that they sold in “fair dealing” and at a “fair price.”134
This arduous burden shift imposed on the directors bolsters the argument for
rejection of Ricca and Johnson’s thesis and the expansion of the Rural Metro
doctrine: if the shareholders can show a possible misuse of the directors’
business judgment, then their action for aiding and abetting becomes slightly
easier to prove as the directors must then overcome the high “entirely fair”
standard.135 If the directors cannot refute the claim, then the second element
is satisfied, and the predicate for the aiding and abetting claim has been
presented.136
The third element rests on the financial advisor’s scienter.137 If the
advisor “knows that the board is breaching its duty of care and participates
in the breach,” then the advisor may be liable for aiding and abetting.138 To
satisfy this element, it must be “reasonably conceivable” from the allegations
that the financial advisor acted with the knowledge that his or her conduct
“advocated or assisted” in the breach of a fiduciary duty.139 To meet this
standard, the advisor must act with the knowledge that the conduct would
further assist or create the board’s breach.140 Sometimes the knowing
participation is so obvious that the court has no trouble assigning liability to
the investment bankers.141 Lastly, the fourth element will be satisfied as long
as there are cognizable damages from the bad sale.142

stockholders.”).
134
Id.; see Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993); see also William
Penn P’ship v. Saliba, 13 A.3d 749, 756–57 (Del. 2011) (holding that an LLC’s board of
directors in a sell-side transaction must ensure both a fair price and fair dealing for its
shareholders).
135
See Lafferty et al., supra note 129, at 842
136
See In re TIBCO Software Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 10319-CB, 2015 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 265, at *79 (Oct. 20, 2015) (“For the reasons explained previously, plaintiff has
adequately alleged a breach of the fiduciary duty of care that the Director Defendants owed
to TIBCO, which this Court has held can form the predicate for an aiding and abetting
claim.”).
137
Rural Metro, 88 A.3d at 97.
138
Id. (“If the third party knows that the board is breaching its duty of care and participates
in the breach by misleading the board or creating the informational vacuum, then the
[advisors] can be liable for aiding and abetting.”).
139
TIBCO, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 265 at *79–80 (“The requirement of participation can
be established if the alleged aider and abettor ‘participated in the board’s decisions, conspired
with [the] board, or otherwise caused the board to make the decisions at issue.’”).
140
See id.; see also In re Del Monte Foods. Co. S’holders Litig., 25 A.3d 813, 837 (Del.
Ch. 2011) (“Under this standard, a bidder’s attempts to reduce the sale price through arm’slength negotiations cannot give rise to liability for aiding and abetting.”).
141
See Rural Metro, 88 A.3d at 97, and TIBCO, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 265 at *79–80,
where the knowing participation was obvious to both courts.
142
See Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1096 (Del. 2001).
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ii. The Rural Metro Doctrine Under Current Case Law
The Rural Metro doctrine and its ruling on financial advisor liability
precisely lends to the high standard that Johnson and Ricca refer to in their
thesis, as the doctrine is one of the many reasons that plaintiffs’ actions
against the financial advisors are often to no avail.143 The financial advisor
does not owe fiduciary duties directly to the corporate client, but they may,
nonetheless, be indirectly liable to the shareholders.144
Since the Rural Metro ruling, the Delaware courts have ruled on a
number of other cases concerning the liability of boards and financial
advisors in sell-side transactions. First, in RBC Capital Markets, LLC v.
Jervis, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Rural Metro ruling.145 The
Court noted that RBC knowingly misled the directors by giving the board
inaccurate and ill-motivated information regarding the sale of the company
to another entity.146 Driven by its own improper motives, “RBC misled the
Rural directors into breaching their duty of care, thereby aiding and abetting
the Board’s breach of its fiduciary obligations.”147
Likewise, in In re TIBCO Software Inc. Stockholders Litigation, the
Delaware Court of Chancery held Goldman Sachs, acting as the financial
advisor in the sell-side merger deal, liable for aiding and abetting a breach
of fiduciary duty by the board of directors.148 In TIBCO, Goldman Sachs
more than simply aided in the breach—it created the breach by advising the
board based on its own motivations and intentions to maximize the sale.149
143
See Johnson, supra note 41. Contra Manesh, supra note 8. Rural Metro involved
extreme facts, and shareholders have since been largely unsuccessful in their actions against
the advisors. See In re KKR Fin. Holdings LLC S’holder Litig., 101 A.3d 980, 1003 (Del.
Ch. 2014); Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015); In re Zale Corp.
Stockholders Litig., No. 9388-VCP, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 249, at *76–78 (Oct. 1, 2015),
rev’d, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 274 (Oct. 29, 2015).
144
Manesh, supra note 8; see Rural Metro, 88 A.3d 54; see also Royce de R. Barondes,
Fiduciary Duties of Officers and Directors of Distressed Corporations, 7 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 45, 76 (1998) (“An investment bank that provides substantial assistance in the
consummation of a transaction that the investment bank knows or should know to be in
violation of a board’s fiduciary duty aids or abets the board’s primary violation and thus will
be liable to the beneficiary of the duty. The cost of that risk ultimately will be reflected in
fees paid to such professionals by firms operating in the vicinity of insolvency.”).
145
RBC Capital Mkts., LLC v. Jervis, 129 A.3d 816 (Del. 2015).
146
Id. at 863.
147
Id.
148
In re TIBCO Software Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 10319-CB, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS
265, at *85 (Oct. 20, 2015).
149
Id. (“[I]t is reasonably conceivable from the facts alleged in the Complaint that
Goldman was motivated to and intentionally created an informational vacuum by failing to
disclose material information to the Board at a critical time when it was evaluating and
reconsidering its options concerning whether it could act to secure some or all of the $100
million in additional equity value that the Board mistakenly believed it had obtained when
approving the Merger. As such, the Complaint sufficiently alleges a claim for aiding and
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Yet, under Delaware law, the plaintiffs could bring only an aiding and
abetting cause of action.150
Subsequent cases threatened the aiding and abetting cause of action.
For example, in In re KKR Financial Holdings LLC Shareholder Litigation,
the Delaware Chancery Court granted a motion to dismiss an aiding and
abetting claim against a sell-side financial advisor because it found no
predicate breach of fiduciary duty.151 That decision was affirmed in Corwin
v. KKR Financial Holdings LLC, where the Delaware Supreme Court upheld
the lower court’s decision, but also established significant precedent that
threatened the aiding and abetting liability imposed on directors.152 The
court held that the shareholders’ “disinterested” vote to approve the sale
invoked the business judgment rule, which protected the board from a
possible breach of fiduciary duty and thereby shielded the advisors from
liability.153
Corwin’s impact is displayed in Delaware’s Zale I and Zale II rulings.
In Zale I, which was decided before Corwin, the Delaware Chancery Court
denied a motion to dismiss a claim against a sell-side financial advisor for
aiding and abetting a corporation’s board.154 After Corwin, however, the
same court reheard the case in Zale II.155 The court reversed its decision by
applying Corwin’s holding and reasoning that, because there was a “fullyinformed” and “disinterested” shareholder vote, the business judgment rule
applied.156 Therefore, the claim against the financial advisor for aiding and
abetting was dismissed.157 After the Zale II ruling, “financial advisors
everywhere no doubt breathed a collective sigh of relief.”158

abetting the Director Defendants’ [breach of the] duty of care.”).
150
See generally In re Rural Metro Corp. Stockholders Litig., 88 A.3d 54 (Del. Ch. 2014);
In re TIBCO Software Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 10319-CB, 2015 LEXIS 265 (Del. Ch.
Oct. 20, 2015); RBC Capital Mkts., LLC v. Jervis, 129 A.3d 816 (Del. 2015); see also
Manesh, supra note 8, at 130.
151
In re KKR Fin. Holdings LLC S’holder Litig., 101 A.3d 980, 1003 (Del. Ch. 2014)
((“An aiding and abetting claim ‘may be summarily dismissed based upon the failure of the
breach of fiduciary duty claims against the director defendants.’”) (citation omitted)).
152
Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015).
153
Id. at 306; see Reder & Estey, supra note 3, at 281.
154
In re Zale Corp. Stockholders Litig., 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 249, at *76–78 (Oct. 1,
2015), rev’d, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 274 (Oct. 29, 2015); see Reder & Estey, supra note 3, at
281.
155
In re Zale Corp. Stockholders Litig., No. 9388-VCP, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 274, (Oct.
29, 2015); see Reder, supra note 3, at 281.
156
Zale, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 274, at *7.
157
Zale, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 274.
158
Reder & Estey, supra note 3, at 281.
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Ultimately, recent case law demonstrates that under the Delaware
courts’ application of the Rural Metro doctrine, financial advisors will be
found liable only in sell-side transactions for “aiding and abetting” a board’s
breach of fiduciary duties, but will not be held directly liable.159 Thus, the
only way shareholders may successfully file suit against sell-side financial
advisors is by a court finding that: (1) the directors had a fiduciary duty to
the shareholders and that they breached that duty; and (2) the investment
advisors aided and abetted the directors in the breach of that duty.160 This
becomes increasingly difficult if the shareholders are allowed an informed
vote to approve the merger.161
It is both the weakness of the aiding and abetting tort and the strictness
of the Rural Metro doctrine, among other things, that fuel the argument that
the doctrine, rooted in Revlon, has begun to diminish,162 and that Rural Metro
left plaintiffs with nothing other than a heavier burden and a “long-shot
aiding and abetting claim.”163 Nonetheless, regardless of the difficulties and
downsides of bringing the claim, following Rural Metro, there was a
dramatic increase in aiding and abetting claims against sell-side financial
advisors.164 As discussed, financial advisor aiding and abetting liability is
completely dependent on a finding of breach of fiduciary duty by the board
regardless of the level of misconduct, ill will, and bad faith by the advisors.165
Professor Manesh is justified in saying the doctrine is still significant and is
adapting to modern corporate law,166 but his thesis falls short of the current
159
See In re Rural Metro Corp. Stockholders Litig., 88 A.3d 54 (Del. Ch. 2014); In re
TIBCO Software Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 10319-CB, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 265 (Oct.
20, 2015); RBC Capital Mkts., LLC v. Jervis, 129 A.3d 816 (Del. 2015).
160
See Rural, 88 A.3d 54; see also Reder & Dodson, supra note 7, at 28 (explaining that
the financial advisors do not receive the same protections as individual directors under section
102(b)(7)).
161
See Zale, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 274. If the shareholders were allowed a vote on the
transaction, a suit against the advisors, or directors for that matter, may be less likely to be
successful, as they themselves had already approved the merger.
162
Johnson & Ricca, supra note 41 (arguing that the Rural Metro doctrine has “dwindled”
over time).
163
Id. at 153 (“But the burden in a Revlon setting can be heavier yet where, as in Rural
Metro, the directors are not defendants in the case because then the plaintiff must also prove
that the directors breached a fiduciary duty. This leaves the plaintiff, not the defendants, with
all the burdens—very high ones—in a long-shot aiding and abetting claim. Rural Metro is a
cautionary tale for egregiously conflicted financial advisers, but, from a remedies perspective,
it is a distinct outlier. These types of claims may arise in Revlon settings—where they
typically fail—but they are not uniquely Revlon duty claims, and they do not ‘limit’ our
thesis.”).
164
Reder & Dodson, supra note 7, at 28 (suggesting that Rural Metro was essentially the
catalyst that bridged the gap from Revlon, focused mainly on directors and boards, to the
modern targeting of the financial advisors in sell-side transactions).
165
See In re Del Monte Foods. Co. S’holders Litig., 25 A.3d 813 (Del. Ch. 2011).
166
See Manesh, supra note 8, at 110.
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and imminent need to take the liability for financial advisors to the next level.
V.

THE IMPORTANCE OF HOLDING SELL-SIDE FINANCIAL
ADVISORS LIABLE

A. Sell-Side Financial Advisors Should be Held to a Higher
Standard
In much of the recent case law, the financial advisors not only
knowingly participated in a board’s breach of fiduciary duties, but they
induced the breach to advance their own interests.167 When the advisor’s
conduct is that clear, the plaintiff shareholders should not have to find a
breach of fiduciary duty by the directors as a predicate. Instead, they should
be able to hold the financial advisors directly accountable for their actions,
perhaps in the form of a direct derivative suit against the advisors. The
advisors’ liability in such situations should not depend on that of the
directors.168
Contrary to the idea that the Revlon doctrine has dwindled,169 the
doctrine has in fact expanded through Rural Metro, with its sights set on
greater shareholder protection through imposing liability on financial
advisors in sell-side M&A transactions.170 The increasing amount of
shareholder litigation generated by change-of-control transactions
demonstrates the Rural Metro doctrine’s contemporary importance and
relevance.171 While Johnson and Ricca question the limitations of the
doctrine in its ability to actually hold financial advisors liable in sell-side
transactions,172 the availability of a cause of action against the advisors,
regardless of the limitations and difficulties, shows the doctrine has, in fact,
expanded since Revlon to adapt to modern corporate law.173 The doctrine
has not shown its age, and, as can be seen in Rural Metro and other recent
167
See In re TIBCO Software Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 10319-CB, 2015 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 265 (Oct. 20, 2015); In re Rural Metro Corp. Stockholders Litig., 88 A.3d 54 (Del.
Ch. 2014).
168
See TIBCO, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 265, at *79 (aiding and abetting liability for breach
of fiduciary duty is dependent on the “predicate” finding of that breach on the part of the
directors); see also In re Zale Corp. Stockholders Litig., No. 9388-VCP, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS
249 (Oct. 1, 2015), rev’d, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 274 (2015) (granting advisors’ motion to
dismiss because there was no liability found on the part of the directors).
169
See Johnson & Ricca, supra note 41.
170
See Manesh, supra note 8 (suggesting that the doctrine is actually expanding to adapt
to modern corporate law and the greater protection of shareholders).
171
See Reder & Estey, supra note 3, at 279–80.
172
See generally Johnson & Ricca, supra note 41.
173
See Revlon, Inc. v. Macandrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986)
(applying the ruling only to directors’ liability). But see In re Rural Metro Corp. Stockholders
Litig., 88 A.3d 54 (Del. Ch. 2014) (expanding the doctrine to liability for financial advisors).
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cases, is actually an incredibly important emerging doctrine through which
plaintiffs can hold the wolves of the corporate world liable for taking
advantage of their vulnerability.174
Yet, there needs to be further expansion in the courts, and possibly the
legislature, to hold investment bankers and other financial advisors liable
when they pursue only their own, and not stockholder, interests. The
financial advisors need to be held accountable for their misconduct, as their
misleading actions have been punished too weakly for too long.175 As
discussed in Part III(A), financial advisors play major roles in the sell-side
transaction and boards rely heavily on their advice.176 The financial advisors
have a great impact on the boards and the corporations that they advise,177
and any misconduct or misleading information can have negative impacts on
the transactions.178
Johnson and Ricca highlight that financial advisors, particularly
investment banks, can be held liable for aiding and abetting, but “such
persons owe no direct fiduciary duties under Revlon, or at all for that
matter.”179 This statement should not be adhered to by the Delaware courts
and legislators. Instead, the modern doctrine stemming from Rural Metro
should be expanded even further to impose fiduciary duties on the financial
advisors, or at least hold them to a higher standard of direct liability.180 There
should be no required predicate for finding the directors liable for breach of
duty to recover from the financial advisors, as it is a hurdle for shareholders
and makes direct action against adverse financial advisers impossible.181
Aiding and abetting liability under Revlon and Rural Metro is not enough—

174
See Rural, 88 A.3d 54; In re TIBCO Software Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 10319CB, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 265 (Oct. 20, 2015).
175
See Reder, supra note 3, at 279 (explaining that, in their search for “deep-pocketed”
defendants, shareholders have recently begun to seek recovery from financial advisors). That
liability has, thus far, only been allowed in the form of aiding and abetting. See generally In
re Rural Metro Corp. Stockholders Litig., 88 A.3d 54 (Del. Ch. 2014); In re TIBCO Software
Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 10319-CB, 2015 LEXIS 265 (Del. Ch. Oct. 20, 2015); RBC
Capital Mkts., LLC v. Jervis, 129 A.3d 816 (Del. 2015); see also Manesh, supra note 8, at
130.
176
See generally Haire, supra note 52 (explaining the three main roles that financial
advisors have in banking).
177
See supra Part III.
178
Haire, supra note 52, at 295; see Oesterle & Norberg, supra note 2, at 211–12; see
also In re Del Monte Foods. Co. S’holders Litig., 25 A.3d 813 (Del. Ch. 2011) (where the
actions of the advisor heavily influenced the board to make a bad sale).
179
Johnson & Ricca, supra note 41, at 152.
180
See Manesh, supra note 8 (explaining that financial advisory liability is dependent on
that of the board).
181
See In re TIBCO Software Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 10319-CB, 2015 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 265 (Oct. 20, 2015) (demonstrating that the court requires a “predicate” finding of
director liability before liability can be imposed on the advisor).
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investment bankers need to be held accountable for their negligent and
adverse actions in M&A transactions, and should not have the doubleprotection of: (1) the hurdle the plaintiffs have to pass in finding liability on
the part of the board; and (2) the weakness of “aiding and abetting,” as
opposed to a form of direct liability.
There was a hint of hope for this argument when the Chancery Court of
Delaware suggested in the Rural Metro proceedings that financial advisors,
particularly investment bankers, are “gatekeepers” who may have some
fiduciary responsibilities to the companies they advise.182 Although the
Delaware Supreme Court did not rule parallel to this argument, at least one
Delaware Court judge has pondered holding the advisors to both a higher
standard and to direct fiduciary duties to the shareholders and the
corporation.183
B. Possible Counter-Arguments
The argument for direct liability on the advisors in M&A transactions
is new and expansive, and, therefore, there are several potential counterarguments. First, some may posit that a more expansive standard would be
too invasive on investment bankers and deter them from advising
corporations in sell-side transactions. An expansion of the doctrine,
however, would not deter advisors from participating in sell-side
transactions; rather, it would most likely deter misconduct. Many of the
largest investment banks generate hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue
through advising M&A deals.184 Therefore, it is likely that they would not
cease advising activities because the standard was heightened. Instead, they
would most likely adapt to the new corporate law just as they have adapted
to Revlon and Rural Metro.185
In addition, some scholars may object to judicial overreach, in
particular that courts should not create fiduciary duties that do not exist.186
They may argue that courts should not be allowed to impose such restrictions
and standards as doing so is a slippery slope: courts may soon use it as a way

182

Reder & Dodson, supra note 7, at 38; In re Rural Metro Corp. Stockholders Litig., 88
A.3d 54, 87 (Del. Ch. 2014) (explaining that financial advisors are “gatekeepers” in sell-side
change-of-control transactions).
183
See Rural Metro, 88 A.3d at 88 (suggesting that advisors as “gatekeepers” may owe
fiduciary duties of their own).
184
See Investment Banking Scorecard, supra note 96; Fortune 500, supra note 95.
185
See Reder & Dodson, supra note 7, at 38. Many of the investment banks listed on the
Fortune 500 are the largest companies and, arguably, would not cease their advising activities
just because the standard has been heightened.
186
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 (2016). The Delaware General Corporation Law does
not provide that fiduciary duties exist between financial advisors and boards of directors or
the corporations they counsel. See id.
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to abuse judicial power.187 Expanding the Rural Metro doctrine, however,
would not be a judicial overstep because the courts would be confined to that
which is warranted by the contemporary corporate world, namely the
protection of shareholders and traded corporations. With so much money at
stake in M&A, and so much litigation resulting from sell-side transactions,
there needs to be more accountability and higher standards to protect
shareholders.188
VI.

CONCLUSION

There is an increasing need for the Delaware courts and legislature to
take action to protect shareholders in sell-side transactions. Financial
advisor control in modern sell-side transaction is undeniable. There are
mergers valued at trillions of dollars annually, with investment banks
generating billions of dollars of revenues from advising those deals. In the
wake of Revlon and Rural Metro, there has been a sharp increase in
shareholder litigation against corporations’ financial advisors. Rural Metro
and other modern case law have expanded the Revlon doctrine to adapt to
the contemporary corporate environment by allowing shareholders to
recover from financial advisors for aiding and abetting claims. The aiding
and abetting claim, however, has proven too weak to hold the advisors liable
for their own misconduct when the court does not find a predicate breach of
the board’s fiduciary duties.
Therefore, the Delaware courts and legislature must further expand the
Rural Metro doctrine to allow for direct financial advisor liability to the
shareholders. This may come in the form of either Delaware-court created
fiduciary duties owed by the advisors to the shareholders, or a heightened
standard imposed by the Delaware legislature that removes the requirement
of a finding of liability on the board of directors. Ultimately, Delaware needs
to adapt to emerging corporate needs, as it did with section102(b)(7), Revlon,
and Rural Metro, and continue to protect the shareholders of its corporations.

187

See Eric Lode, Slippery Slope Arguments and Legal Reasoning, 87 CAL. L. REV. 1469
(1999) (defining “slippery slope” and its implications).
188
See Investment Banking Scorecard, supra note 96; see also Reder & Estey, supra note
3, at 280.

